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MS.  BERGER:  Welcome  to  this  wonderful  trademark  panel,  “Iconic  Brands: 
Creating  Trademark  Law  for  the  Few.”  
My  name  is  Magdalena  Berger.  I’m  insanely  excited  to  be  here.  I’m  insanely 
excited  to  be  moderating  a  panel  that  doesn’t  have  the  word  “update”  in  it.  I’m  almost 
sure  it’s  the  first  for  me,  and  this  is  my  seventh  or  eighth  conference,  so  this  is  going  to  be 
amazing  really. 
I  have  a  wonderful  panel  —  Anderson  Duff,  Peter  Ruess,  Tobias  Timmann, 
Emily  Borich,  and  Daan  Erikson  —  all  are  enthusiastic  trademark  lawyers,  and  we  are  all 
here  to  discuss  iconic  brands.  
I  am  going  to  add  one  preface.  “Iconic”  does  not  necessarily  mean  luxury.  Just 
throwing  it  out  there  so  you  get  the  right  frame  of  mind. 
Peter,  why  don’t  you  start,  now  that  we  are  all  here  and  settled  and  happy? 
PROF.  DR.  RUESS:  Hello,  everybody.  Good  to  be  back.  I  want  to  talk  to  you 
about  the Louboutin  decision,  which  I  think  —  unfairly  so  —  has  been  trivialized  in  one  
1
or  more  legal  journals.  But  we  will  talk  more  about  that  later. 
The  factual  setting  is  relatively  well-known  to  all  of  you.  Let  me  just  briefly 
recap  this.  In  the  1990s  Christian  Louboutin,  a  very  famous  (usually  mispronounced) 
shoe  designer,  had  an  issue  because  he  felt  that  his  shoes  didn’t  adequately  portray  a 
three-dimensional  image  —  as  if  he  had  known  that  we  in  the  trademark  community 
would  discuss  the  three-dimension  feature  later  —  so  he  ended  up  stealing  a  bottle  of  nail 
polish  from  his  assistant  and  colored  the  sole  red.  This  was  the  start  of  a  very  successful 
fashion  item  which,  in  addition  to  national  trademarks,  ended  up  with  an  EU  Trade  Mark 
registration  in  2010  for  “high-heeled  shoes  with  the  exception  of  orthopedic  shoes.”  As  a 
side  note,  if  you  have  ever  seen  these  shoes,  he  has  kept  true  to  the  registration;  they  are 
certainly  not  orthopedic.= 
Our  story  starts  when  a  case  was  litigated  in  a  Dutch  court  against  a  company 
called  Van  Haren,  which  also  produced  shoes  with  red  soles.  That  court  considered  the 
issue  of  whether  the  red  sole  trademark  was  inherently  registerable  or  not  because  it 
consisted  exclusively  of  a  shape  or  a  characteristic  that  “added  substantial  value.”  That’s 
7(1)(e)  of  the  Union  Mark  Regulation  (UMR) . 
2
If  you  look  at  this  trademark,  it  covers  the  color  red  applied  to  the  sole  of  a  shoe. 
The  outline  of  the  shoe  is  not  part  of  the  trademark,  which  for  all  of  us  who  read  and 
work  on  trademark  applications  is  visible  because  we  have  a  dotted  line,  so  the  shoe 
doesn’t  take  part  in  the  sign.  Up  to  then  there  was  some  discussion  whether  this  is  a  shape 
mark  or  a  color  mark.  It  is  actually  none  of  the  above.  It  is  a  position  mark. 
1  Case  C-163/16,  Louboutin  v.  Van  Haren  Schoenen  BV  (June  12,  2018), 
http://curia.europa.eu. 
2  Regulation  (EU)  2017/1001  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  14  June 
2017  on  the  European  Union  trade  mark.  
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The  point  where  you  usually  close  the  book  on  this  case  is  that  the  CJEU  said  that  the  
3
color  is  not  considered  as  “a  sign  consisting  of  a  shape,”  even  less  “exclusively  of  a 
shape,”  and  it  did  away  with  the  idea  that  was  raised  in  legal  literature  that  shape  could  be 
two-dimensional.  Shape,  per  se,  cannot  be  two-dimensional;  a  two-dimensional  shape  is  a 
picture. 
However,  why  I  think  this  case  deserves  a  second  look  is  because  of  the 
underlying  considerations  that  particularly  were  raised  by  the  Advocate  General.  As  you 
will  know,  the  Court  very  often  tends  to  follow  the  Advocate  General.  Not  so  in  this  case. 
The  Advocate  General  said  a  position  mark,  and  this  mark  here  as  well,  “must  be 
measured  according  to  the  rules  for  three-dimensional  marks  if  they  are  inseparably 
linked  to  the  appearance  of  the  goods.”  That  seems  logical  at  first  glance,  but  what  does 
that  mean? 
If  you  look  at  this  L EVI ’ S  little  red  sign  here,  is  it  adding  substantial  value  to  the 
goods  covered  by  the  mark?  Yes.  Does  it  matter  where  it  is?  Well,  yes.  If  you  sew  it  to  the 
knee  of  the  jeans,  it  will  probably  generate  another  effect. 
But  if  we  take  that  seriously  —  and  this  leads  me  to  cons  of  what  the  Advocate 
General  says  —  then  I  can  do  away  with  position  marks  because  every  position  mark, 
wherever  it  is,  will  add  substantial  characteristic  to  the  product.  This  very  narrow 
understanding  would  lead  to  a  situation  where  I  do  not  have  any  position  marks.  
A  further  controlling  thought  is,  let’s  say  I  register  a  color,  an  abstract  color 
trademark.  I  can  get  that  if  I  prove  that  it  is  distinctive,  but  I  cannot  get  a  mark  that  has 
failed  the  functionality  test  because  7(3)  UMR   doesn’t  reference  7(1)(e).  
4
That  means  if  I  fail  the  functionality  test,  distinctiveness  will  not  help,  and  that 
would  lead  to  the  result  that  I  can  get  the  color,  but  I  can’t  get  the  color  at  a  certain 
position,  which  I  consider  not  overly  logical. 
The  real  takeaway  from  the Louboutin  case,  in  my  personal  opinion,  is  that  there 
is  quite  a  lot  of  ambiguity  and  misunderstanding  to  the  point  of  what  actually  is  a  shape 
mark,  what  actually  is  a  color  mark,  and  what  actually  is  a  position  mark,  and  it  shows 
that  there  are  still  a  lot  of  issues  dealing  with  a  position  mark  and  how  should  we 
approach  a  position  mark.  
 Certainly,  the  position  mark  cannot  be  subjected  to  the  stringent  functionality  test.  Well,  
why  not?  Can  I  have  a  functionality  test  at  all?  Yes,  but  it  would  mean  that  I  have  a 
function. 
Probably  those  of  you  who  own  these  shoes  can  attest  it  doesn’t  have  the  slightest 
function.  On  the  contrary  —  I  see  Susan  laughing,  who  probably  owns  a  sizable 
collection  of  them;  I  should  ask  you  for  a  specimen  —  if  you  walk  on  it,  it  will  just  wear 
off.  So  it  is  only  an  aesthetical  design  and,  therefore,  not  open  to  the  functionality  test. 
That  concludes  my  remarks.  I  will  tender  the  remaining  one  minute  —  ha-ha  — 
to  the  pot.  Thank  you  very  much. 
MS.  BERGER:  So,  Peter,  you  know  the  reason  you’re  here  today  and  you  get  to 
talk  about Louboutin ?  You  don’t  get  to  talk  about  it  because  it’s  such  an  interesting  case; 
3  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union. 
4  Art.  7  (3):  “Paragraph  1(b),  (c)  and  (d)  shall  not  apply  if  the  trade  mark  has  become 
distinctive  in  relation  to  the  goods  or  services  for  which  registration  is  requested  as  a  consequence 
of  the  use  which  has  been  made  of  it.”  
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you  get  to  talk  about  it  because  there  are  people  —  I’m  not  going  to  name  any  names  — 
who  think  that  this  was  all  a  lot  of  nothing  for  one  brand,  mostly  maybe  even  PR.  But 
from  a  legal  standpoint  those  cases  didn’t  add  any  value  to  trademark  law,  did  they? 
PROF.  DR.  RUESS:  First  observation:  Was  this  the  groundbreaking  case  that  we 
all  needed?  Probably  not.  Can  we  order  the  groundbreaking  cases  that  we  all  need?  Does 
the  legal  community  do  us  the  favor  to  bring  cases  that  just  enlighten  us  and  help  us  to 
develop  new  principles?  Probably  not. 
I  think  the  case  is  indicative  for  what  I  tried  to  mention  in  my  last  sentence,  that 
we  need  a  clearer  understanding  dogmatically  of  what  is  which  kind  of  trademark.  But,  as 
I  have  neither  filed  nor  argued  nor  decided  the  case,  I  could  live  with  the  assessment  that 
it’s  not  the  “case  of  the  century,”  if  you  want. 
MS.  BERGER:  As  is  the  good  practice  at  Fordham,  I  will  always  prioritize 
questions  from  the  audience.  
QUESTION  [Christian  Liedtke,  acuminis  PC,  Costa  Mesa]:  Peter,  coming  from 
Europe  myself,  I  was  wondering  if  you  could  clarify  the  functionality  understanding  here.  
As  a  U.S.  practitioner,  the  first  thing  that  comes  to  my  mind  is  that  U.S. 
trademark  law,  specifically  U.S.  trade  dress  law,  as  was  quite  clear  in  the Converse  case, 
recognizes  two  different  types  of  functionality:  we  have  utilitarian  functionality,  where 
you  actually  have  something  that  has  a  purpose;  and  we  have  something  called  aesthetic 
functionality,  where  the  functionality  flows  from  the  value  and,  therefore,  we  would  have 
a  problem  awarding  protection.  How  does  functionality  work  in  this  context  in  Europe? 
PROF.  DR.  RUESS:  Well,  the  law  says  that  you  cannot  get  a  trademark.  Let’s 
take  an  example.  If  you  have  a  liquid  in  a  bottle,  then  this  bottle  will  hold  the  liquid,  and 
that’s  functional.  The  problem  with  the  7(1)(e)  test  is,  what  does  it  mean  by  “it  adds 
substantial  value?” 
That  is  a  very  good  question.  If  we  were  to  say  that  adding  any  aesthetic  value 
would  be  enough  to  fulfill  the  test,  which  people  do,  then  goodbye  position  marks 
because  every  position  mark  adds  some  sort  of  value  at  this  very  position. 
QUESTION  [Gordon  Humphreys,  EUIPO  Boards  of  Appeal,  Alicante]:  Thank 
you  for  a  very  entertaining  rendition  of  that  judgment.  I  never  realized  the  humor  in  that 
judgment. 
PROF.  DR.  RUESS:  The  orthopedic  shoes  you  mean? 
QUESTIONER  [Mr.  Humphreys]:  One  thing  that  strikes  me  is  that,  of  course,  the 
law  has  actually  changed  since  that  judgment  was  handed  down  because  of  Article 
7(1)(e)  having  undergone  a  revamp  when  the  legal  reform  occurred  to  the  European 
Union  Trademark  Regulation.  Now  the  Regulation  talks  about  “any  other  characteristic,” 
not  just  the  shape  but  “any  other  characteristic  that  adds  substantial  value.” 
PROF.  DR.  RUESS:  Yes,  it  says  “shape  or  any  other  characteristic.” 
QUESTIONER  [Mr.  Humphreys]:  Yes,  correct.  So  my  question  is:  do  you  think 
that  this  “any  other  characteristic”  now  is  the  death  knell,  if  I  could  put  it  that  way,  for  the 
coexistence  or  double  registration  of  designs  and  trademarks? 
PROF.  DR.  RUESS:  I  don’t  think  it  is  the  nail  in  the  coffin.  For  this  case  I 
personally  —  I’m  now  arguing  policy  a  bit  —  don’t  think  it  would,  and  I  don’t  think  it 
should  change  things.  If  you  say  that  it  “adds  substantial  value”  and  we  define  this  as  a 
characteristic  that  adds  substantial  value,  then  again  I  come  back  to  my  previous 
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argument.  The  Adidas  stripes,  the  Levi  Strauss  little  red  tag  —  I  cannot  imagine  a  single 
position  mark  which  would  not  fulfill  that  test. 
Logically,  the  thing  that  strikes  me  if  you  attack  this  line  of  thought  —  I’m  happy 
for  new  ideas  —  is  that  because  the  legislature  decided  that  I  cannot  overcome  this  hurdle 
with  distinctiveness  and  because  the  legislature  allows  me  to  register  an  abstract  color,  it 
cannot  be  right  that  I  cannot  get  less,  which  is  a  color  at  a  certain  position,  but  I  can  get 
the  color.  A  reading  of  the  statute  which  would  lead  to  that  result  in  my  view  would  be 
flawed. 
MS.  BERGER:  Actually,  we  are  out  of  time  for  discussion  right  now,  but  please 
hold  your  question  because  we  have  time  for  a  general  discussion  after.  I  just  want  to 
make  sure  we  have  enough  time  for  all  the  talks. 
Anderson,  let’s  move  to  the  United  States. 
MR.  DUFF:  I  first  want  to  tell  a  brief  story  about  the  great  Hugh  Hansen.  I  don’t 
know  if  anyone  else  was  caught  in  the  cloudburst  earlier  today,  but  one  day  when  I  was  a 
Fellow  at  the  Institute  and  a  student  here,  Hugh  called  me  to  his  office  late  at  night,  and 
we  were  trying  to  decide  which  of  two  umbrellas  we  should  purchase  for  the  conference. 
We  had  a  low-quality  but  much  cheaper  umbrella  and  a  very  expensive,  high-quality 
umbrella.  
I  went  on  a  pretty  long  rant  about  how,  “Hugh,  this  is  an  IP  conference;  this  is 
your  brand;  it’s  worth  investing  in.”  I  just  went  on  and  on. 
At  the  end,  Hugh  looked  at  me  across  his  desk  the  way  he  does  sometimes,  and 
he  said,  “That  might  be  some  bullshit,  but  it’s  some  good  bullshit.”  From  then  on,  they’ve 
had  the  best  umbrellas  here.  [Laughter] 
MS.  BERGER:  Let’s  make  use  of  the  time  and  use  it  for  questions.  Let’s  discuss 
your  question.  
QUESTION  [Anne  Marie  Verschuur,  Nautadutilh,  Amsterdam]:  I  think  you 
mentioned  before  that  the  way  the  laws  work,  marks  like  the  A DIDAS  stripes,  etc.,  couldn’t 
exist. 
I  think  that  the  solution  is  that  the  law  should  be  changed  as  for  signs  that  give  an 
essential  value  to  the  goods.  Acquired  significance  should  be  allowed.  Actually,  that  is 
the  position  that  the  International  Association  for  the  Protection  of  Intellectual  Property 
(AIPPI)  has  taken  in  a  recent  resolution. 
So  my  recommendation  to  the  European  Union  would  be  to  change  the  law.  I 
know  that  is  not  as  easy,  but  I  think  the  law  should  be  changed.  I  think  actually  the  Max 
Planck  study  also  mentioned  this.  So  that  would  be  my  comment. 
PROF.  DR.  RUESS:  I  would  second  that.  I’m  always  for  trademark  law—  I’m 
ducking  here  to  see  that  Marshall  isn’t  throwing  anything  at  me  —  but  I  wasn’t  involved 
in  the  Louboutin  case  and,  unfortunately,  I  can’t  change  the  law  either.  [Laughter] 
MS.  BERGER:  Any  other  questions  or  comments  while  we  are  battling  technical 
difficulties? 
[No  response] 
Then  I  have  a  question.  I  still  have  a  beef  with  this  case,  and  mostly  it  started 
with  the  case  in  the  United  States.  Sorry,  Peter,  but  I’m  going  to  keep  hammering  that 
point. 
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I’m  wondering  whether  that  precedent  is  helpful  to  anyone  but  the  biggest  and 
largest  brand  owners.  It  really  comes  down  to  whether  trademark  law  should  be  for  all 
trademark  owners,  but  really  there  are  two  separate  sets  of  laws.  
While  it’s  highly  interesting  and  intellectually  engaging  to  talk  about  cases  like 
Louboutin ,  do  you  need  it  in  your  daily  practice?  Nine  out  of  ten  clients  won’t  consider 
filing  suit  in  the  United  States  in  several  instances  and  go  all  the  way  to  the  CJEU  to  then 
get  a  court  decision  that’s  unclear  at  best. 
PROF.  DR.  RUESS:  That  is  a  fair  point.  You  can  approach  this  from  two  angles. 
It  is  a  common  notion  at  Fordham  —  and  I  don’t  even  say  it’s  wrong  to  say  —  that 
trademark  law  is  for  the  big  companies  and  they  get  special  treatment.  Well,  yes,  they 
might  pave  the  way  for  certain  decisions.  
I  have,  just  very  briefly,  two  comments.  First  of  all,  they  usually  are  the  marks 
that  have  the  fame,  the  distinction,  and  of  course  the  commercial  resources,  that  makes  it 
worthwhile  to  litigate.  It  might  not  be  the  case  in Louboutin ,  but  I  think  we  can  find 
various  decisions  where  big  trademarks  have  taken  on  a  theoretical  issue  that  led  to  final 
court  decisions  that  in  the  end  benefit  even  small  trademark  owners. 
MS.  BERGER:  Fair  enough.  Fair  point. 
It  seems  like  poor  Anderson  will  forsake  technology  and  go  old  school. 
MR.  DUFF:  I  only  had  a  few  images  anyway,  but  since  we  are  talking  about 
design  marks  it  would  have  been  nice  to  have  them.  I’ll  just  do  my  best  to  describe  them. 
But  that’s  an  excellent  segue  into  my  presentation.  
I’ve  been  asked  to  talk  about Converse .  I  think  we’ve  probably  all  heard  about 
5
“ Converse  v.  The  World ,”  but,  as  I  was  thinking  about  the  ITC  litigation  and  now  the  
6
Federal  Circuit’s  decision  vacating  and  remanding  that  decision  in  the  context  of  this 
panel,  it  occurred  to  me,  exactly  what  Peter  just  said,  that  trademarks  do  not  just  protect 
luxury  and  iconic  brands;  they  allow  small  brands  to  become  iconic. 
I  will  share  an  experience  at  the  end  of  my  presentation  that  really  led  me  to 
believe  that  what  you  need  for  a  strong  trademark  is  community.  Maybe  that’s  cheesy,  but 
we’ll  get  to  that,  and  I’ll  see  if  I  can  lead  you  to  the  same  place. 
In  talking  about Converse  I  remember  when  Susan  Scafidi  made  a  presentation 
about  the Louboutin  shoe  case  and  brought  in  some  shoes  for  everybody  to  look  at.  I  
7
remember  holding  those  shoes  and  thinking, Wow,  these  are  really  amazing! Thankfully 
for  you,  my  fiancée  decided  it  would  not  be  funny  if  I  brought  in  a  bag  of  shoes  for  my 
talk  about  the  Converse  case,  so  you  all  lucked  out  there. 
If  you  remember  the  ITC  litigation,  Converse  sued  just  about  everybody  in  the 
world  who  makes  shoes  looking  for  an  exclusion  order  relating  to  several  of  its 
trademarks,  including  the  design  mark  of  the  band  around  the  top  and  the  toecap  of  its 
shoes. 
5  Converse,  Inc.  v.  International  Trade  Commission  Sketchers  U.S.A.,  Inc.,  909  F.3d  1110 
(Fed.  Cir.  2018). 
6  In  the  Matter  of  Certain  Footwear  Products,  USITC  Inv.  No.  337-TA-936 
(U.S.Intern.Trade  Com'n),  2016  WL  3475715  (June  23,  2016). 
7  Christian  Louboutin  S.A.  v.  Yves  Saint  Laurent  America  Holdings,  Inc.,  696  F.3d  206 
(2d  Cir.  2012). 
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I  will  read  to  you  the  description  from  the  registration  since  I  do  not  have  an 
image  of  it:  “The  mark  consists  of  the  design  of  two  stripes  on  the  midsole  of  the  shoe, 
the  design  of  the  toecap,  the  design  of  the  multilayered  toe  bumper  featuring  diamonds 
and  line  patterns,  and  the  relative  position  of  these  elements  to  each  other.”  If  you  can’t 
quite  picture  that,  the  two  lines  are  not  as  apparent  as  you  might  think,  at  least  in  my 
opinion. 
The  ITC  decided  that  the  registration  was  invalid  and  that  Converse  could  not 
establish  common  law  rights,  and  so  they  decided  that  as  to  that  mark  Converse  was  also 
asserting  common  law  rights.  They  could  not  show  secondary  meaning,  and  so  they  could 
not  get  an  exclusion  order  as  to  shoes  with  that  design  element. 
I  don’t  want  to  talk  too  much  about  the  details  of Converse ,  the  Federal  Circuit’s 
recent  decision  to  vacate  and  remand  that  decision,  because  I  believe  Marshall  Leaffer  is 
going  to  cover  that  in  greater  detail. 
MS.  BERGER:  Marshall  says  no. 
MR.  DUFF:  Well,  I’ve  already  decided  not  to,  so,  Marshall,  it’s  all  yours.  You  are 
also  doing  the  trademark  update.  I  am  still  going  to  discuss  it,  but  I  did  want  to  get  on  to  a 
couple  of  other  cases  as  well. 
In  deciding  whether  or  not  Converse  could  show  secondary  meaning  for  its 
design,  the  ITC  considered  evidence  going  back  to  1932,  when  the  design  for  C HUCK 
T AYLOR  shoes  was  first  released  to  the  public. 
I  would  like  to  highlight  one  thing  here.  Brands  have  an  arc.  C HUCK  T AYLORS 
don’t  mean  the  same  thing  to  me  that  they  mean  to  my  father,  and  they  don’t  mean  the 
same  thing  to  my  youngest  sister  even  than  they  mean  to  me. 
The  ITC  litigation  occurred  after  Nike  had  acquired  Converse.  I’m  speculating 
here,  but  I  think  it’s  probably  likely  that  was  a  choice  that  Nike  was  making  to  maximize 
the  value  of  the  brand.  Perhaps  that’s  a  good  way  to  say  it. 
I  think  for  this  discussion  the  most  important  aspect  of  the  Federal  Circuit’s 
recent  decision  in  October  of  2018  is  the  district  court  had  looked  at  decisions  going  back 
to  1932  to  determine  whether  or  not  secondary  meaning  had  been  proven,  and  although 
they  should  be  allowed  to  consider  all  that  material,  by  far  the  most  relevant  material  is 
the  material  from  the  last  five  years.  I  think  that  makes  sense  because  a  trademark  is 
about  what  consumers  are  thinking  of  the  mark  at  that  moment.  A  trademark  is  a  source 
identifier.  It’s  not  a  nostalgia  factor. 
At  the  end  of  last  year  or  earlier  this  year  I  found  out  that  the  DeLorean  Motor 
Company  is  still  operating  when  I  had  a  client  who  manufactured  skin  cream  and  named 
one  of  its  lines  D E L OREAN  skin  cream.  When  I  was  first  talking  to  my  client,  they  told  me 
that  they  had  no  idea  that  the  D E L OREAN  used  to  be  a  car.  They  thought  D E L OREAN  was  the 
time  machine  from Back  to  the  Future .  I  immediately  thought  they  were  lying  to  me.  I 
asked  their  ages  and  started  grilling  them,  and  then  I  started  doing  the  math.  These 
co-founders,  God  bless  them,  were  in  their  early  twenties.  It  checks  out.  So  D E L OREAN 
means  something  completely  different  to  them  than  it  does  to  me  even,  and  I’m  not  that 
old. 
That  case  illustrates  another  interesting  thing  to  me:  it’s  the  nostalgia 
phenomenon,  where  old  brands  are  acquired  and  then  resurrected.  The  DeLorean  Motor 
Company  that  operates  today  has  nothing  to  do  with  John  DeLorean,  who  was  entrapped 
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by  the  federal  government,  in  my  opinion.  If  you  don’t  know  that  story  —  I  didn’t  until 
this  case  —  but  it  involves  cocaine,  tens  of  thousands  of  dollars;  it’s  an  amazing  story. 
The  DeLorean  Motor  Company  as  it  operates  today  didn’t  get  a  license  from  the 
DeLorean  family.  All  they  got  was  a  settlement  that  said  the  DeLorean  family  would  no 
longer  sue  them.  That  does  not  stop  the  DeLorean  Motor  Company  from  claiming  that 
they  can  claim  priority  going  all  the  way  back  to  the  DeLorean  Motor  Company. 
Thank  you.  
MS.  BERGER:  Thank  you,  Anderson. 
You  brought  up  an  interesting  point.  You  said  that  Nike  acquired  Converse  in 
2003,  which  was  about  ten  years  before  Converse  started  the  lawsuit? 
MR.  DUFF:  It  was  a  couple  of  years  before,  and  that’s  pure  speculation  on  my 
part,  but  there  might  be  people  here  who  know.  
MS.  BERGER:  But  I’m  going  to  use  it.  I’m  going  to  use  this  and  go  for  it,  and 
I’m  going  to  ask  Emily:  it  seems  like  that  especially  high-end  brands  or  luxury  brands 
right  now  have  that  kind  of  strategic  thinking.  I  think  that  luxury  brands  just  have  a 
different  way  of  going  about  business,  and  they  might  have  other  business  strategies  aside 
from  just  pure  trademark  litigation  to  get  rid  of  counterfeit  goods  or  to  get  rid  of 
secondary  market  goods. 
MS.  BORICH:  Right.  I  know  we  are  going  to  talk  about  exhaustion  in  a  few 
minutes,  but  I  think  it’s  interesting  how  many  acquisitions  of  resellers  took  place  this  past 
year.  For  example,  Richemont  acquired  Watchfinder,  which  is  a  resale  watch  company; 
and  Farfetch,  which  is  a  luxury  retailer,  acquired  Stadium  Goods,  a  sneaker  consignment 
site.  These  are  just  a  couple  of  examples.  I  think  Foot  Locker  just  invested  in  a  sneaker 
resale  company  as  well.  It  is  interesting  because  there  is  kind  of  a  love/hate  relationship 
with  resellers,  but  it  seems  like  maybe  the  luxury  companies  are  trying  to  exert  some  sort 
of  control  past  the  first  sale  of  these  goods. 
There’s  the  other  side  of  it,  too.  For  example,  Chanel  is  suing  The  RealReal  right 
now  because  they  are  selling  Chanel  bags  that  —  while  they  might  be  authentic,  the 
people  at  The  RealReal  aren’t  trained  by  Chanel  to  actually  say  that  they  are  authentic.  It 
is  an  interesting  tug  of  war. 
But  these  are  the  brands  that  have  the  money  and  the  access  to  be  able  to  acquire 
other  companies  and  have  a  strategic  plan  on  the  business  side  that  affects  things  on  the 
legal  side. 
MS.  BERGER:  It’s  similar  to  the Converse  case  in  the  sense  that  Converse  went 
to  the  ITC,  which  I  think  —  correct  me  if  I’m  wrong  —  is  a  highly  unusual  move,  right? 
MR.  DUFF:  At  the  time  it  certainly  was.  The  firm  I  was  working  at  in  Boston 
when  ITC  cases  were  coming  into  vogue  did  a  lot  of  patent  litigation,  and  our  litigation 
team  started  resorting  to  ITC  cases  more  frequently  because  they  had  an  accelerated 
schedule  —  you  could  be  in  front  of  an  administrative  law  judge  very  quickly  —  and  the 
rulings  were  very  effective. 
MS.  BERGER:  We  have  an  audience  question.  Christian? 
QUESTION  [Christian  Liedtke,  acuminis  PC,  Costa  Mesa]:  Lena,  if  you’ll 
permit  me,  it’s  a  little  more  a  comment  than  a  question.  
 
Verbatim  Transceedings,  Inc. 714/960-4577 
9 
     Session  10A 
 
 
You  asked  whether  it  is  a  highly  unusual  move  to  litigate  this  thing  in  the  ITC.  I 
should  preface  this  by  saying  that  my  firm  represented  one  of  the  thirty  or  so  defendants 
or  respondents  in  that  ITC  investigation,  so  I’m  intimately  familiar  with  it. 
It  wasn’t  so  unusual  because  (1)  Converse  didn’t  care  about  money;  they  just 
wanted  the  market  to  be  clear;  (2)  they  knew  that  if  they  had  tried  this  case  to  a  jury  they 
would  have  been  thrown  out  of  court  in  no  time;  and  (3)  really  interestingly,  there  is 
actually  a  footwear  trademark  precedent  at  the  ITC,  the Crocs  case,  which  was  decided 
just  a  couple  of  years  before  that.  I’ll  leave  it  at  that.  Everything  else  I’ll  reserve  for  the 
reception. 
MS.  BERGER:  Thank  you.  
Other  questions  or  comments  from  the  panel  or  the  audience?  Professor  Scafidi. 
QUESTION  [Prof.  Susan  Scafidi,  Fordham  University  School  of  Law,  Fashion 
Law  Institute  at  Fordham]:  Thank  you  for  the  shout-out,  both  of  you. 
Very  quickly,  I  want  to  come  back  to Converse ,  the  case  that  you  are  not  going  to 
talk  about  in  detail.  The  important  five-year  period  referred  to  by  the  court  in  its 
exclusivity  of  use  factor  analysis,  of  course,  is  not  five  years  from  the  moving  target  of 
when  the  Court  gets  the  case  or  when  it  is  decided  or  when  it  is  appealed;  it’s  five  years 
prior  to  some  relevant  date.  I’m  wondering  what  this  means  in  practice  terms  since  we 
have  so  many  distinguished  practitioners  on  the  panel  and  in  the  room.  Are  we  going  to 
have  to  stop  hiring  survey  experts  and  hire  historians?  How  do  you  think  this  is  going  to 
play  out  in  practice? 
MR.  DUFF:  That’s  an  excellent  question.  To  be  clear,  the  Federal  Circuit  said  it 
is  five  years  from  the  “relevant  date.”  It  could  be  from  the  registration,  right,  but  it  could 
also  be  from  the  date  of  infringement.  That’s  exactly  what  I  was  thinking.  We  would  need 
DeLorean  to  go  back  and  hire  a  survey  expert.  I’m  not  sure  how  that’s  going  to  play  out. 
It’s  going  to  be  very  difficult.  
I  think  surveys  are  always  very  problematic,  but  finding  out  what  is  in 
consumers’  heads  is  something  people  have  been  trying  to  do  for  a  long  time,  but  I  think 
we  still  aren’t  very  good  at  it. 
I  don’t  have  a  great  answer  for  you,  but  it’s  a  great  question. 
MR.  ERIKSON:  Anderson,  I  thought  you  were  going  to  say  that  you’d  have  to 
take  a  D E L OREAN  to  go  do  a  survey. 
MR.  DUFF:  Did  I  not  say  that? 
MR.  ERIKSON:  To  time  travel  to  do  the  survey. 
MR.  DUFF:  Oh,  I’m  in  a  loop.  Again. 
MR.  ERIKSON:  It’s  a  bad  joke.  It’s  fine. 
MS.  BERGER:  We  have  one  more  question.  I  don’t  want  to  ignore  you. 
QUESTION  [Marshall  Leaffer,  Maurer  School  of  Law,  Indiana  University]:  It 
makes  sense  to  use  a  “five  year  from  the  relevant  date”  rule  of  thumb  for  determining 
secondary  meaning.  After  all,  secondary  meaning  analysis  seeks  to  determine  what  is  “in 
the  minds  of  consumers.”  That’s  why  the  Federal  Circuit  directed  the  ITC  to  rely  on  prior 
uses  occurring  within  five  years  before  the  relevant  date.  Uses  older  than  five  years  may 
be  of  importance  if  there  is  evidence  that  those  uses  were  likely  to  have  an  effect  on 
consumers’  perceptions  as  of  the  relevant  date. 
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MR.  DUFF:  Well,  it’s  not  irrelevant  to  Converse,  and  maybe  to  old-timers  it  is 
not  irrelevant;  but  are  old-timers  the  current  relevant  consumer? 
QUESTIONER  [Prof.  Leaffer]:  From  the  standpoint  of  infringement. 
MR.  DUFF:  Right,  and  that’s  what  I’m  saying.  It  may  be  that  people  fondly 
remember  1932  when  C ONVERSE  and  K EDS  were  competing,  but  those  people  are  probably 
not  the  relevant  consumers  at  this  point  in  time.  So  I  think  that  moving  away  from  that 
historical  focus  is  a  good  idea. 
QUESTIONER  [Prof.  Leaffer]:  It  seems  strange  to  me  that  it  took  this  long  to 
have  a  precedential  decision  on  something  that  seems  to  me  so  obvious,  but  then  again, 
that’s  progress.  [Laughter] 
MS.  BERGER:  On  that  note,  we  are  going  to  move  on  to  the  situation  in  Europe. 
MR.  TIMMANN:  Thank  you,  Lena.  
We  already  touched  upon  the  question  of  whether  or  not  there  are  two  separate 
sets  of  laws  for  luxury  good  trademarks  on  the  one  hand  and  normal  trademarks  on  the 
other  hand,  and  I  will  try  to  shed  some  light  on  the  question  whether  or  not  there  are 
specific  exceptions  to  the  principle  of  trademark  exhaustion  for  luxury  goods  under  EU 
law. 
The  applicable  law  is  Article  15  of  the  Trademark  Directive ,  or  Article  15  of  the 
8
EU  Trademark  Regulation ,  which  are  identical.  Those  include  the  general  rule  that  a 
9
proprietor  of  a  trademark  shall  not  be  entitled  to  prohibit  the  use  in  relation  to  goods 
which  have  been  put  on  the  market  in  the  European  Union  by  the  proprietor  or  with  its 
consent. 
In  the  second  paragraph  there  is  an  exception  to  this  rule:  Trademark  exhaustion 
“shall  not  apply  where  there  exist  legitimate  reasons  for  the  proprietor  to  oppose  further 
commercialization  of  the  goods.”  These  legitimate  reasons  may  be  the  gateway  for  luxury 
brand  owners  in  respect  to  this  exhaustion  point. 
In  the  CJEU  case  law  there  are  indeed  examples  —  they  are  quite  old,  ten  years 
and  older  —  where  the  Court  has  held  that  “damage  done  to  the  reputation  of  a  trademark 
may  in  principle  be  a  legitimate  reason  within  the  meaning  of  Article  15,  Paragraph  2, 
allowing  the  proprietor  of  the  mark  to  oppose  further  commercialization  of  luxury  goods 
although  they  have  been  put  on  the  market  in  the  European  Union  by  him  or  with  his 
consent.” 
What  does  this  mean?  I  brought  two  recent  cases  where  courts  had  to  deal  with 
this  question. 
The  first  case  is  from  the  United  Kingdom, Nomination  v.  Brealey .  Nomination 
10
manufactures  and  sells  “composable”  bracelets,  which  consist  of  individual  links,  and 
those  may  be  detached  and  include  so-called  “base  links,”  which  bear  the  N OMINATION 
device  mark,  and  you  can  see  them  on  the  right-hand  side  here. 
8  Directive  (EU)  2015/2436  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  16 
December  2015  to  approximate  the  laws  of  the  Member  States  relating  to  trade  marks,  2015  O.J. 
(L  336)  1.  
9  Regulation  (EU)  2017/1001  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  14  June 
2017  on  the  European  Union  trade  mark,  2017  O.J.  (L  154)  1.  
10   Nomination  Di  Antonio  E  Paolo  Gensini  SNC  v.  Brealey  [2019]  EWHC  599  (IPEC). 
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The  defendants  bought  original  base  bracelets  from  Nomination,  dissembled  the 
bracelets,  put  them  into  individual  links,  repackaged  them,  and  then  sold  the  individual 
links  together  with  the  links  they  had  manufactured.  The  N OMINATION  base  link  at  the  end 
was  sold  in  a  small  plastic  bag  bearing  the  label,  “manufactured  by  Nomination  Italy  and 
repackaged  by  defendants.” 
The  Court  held  that  there  was  no  exhaustion,  and  the  reasons  for  this  were  indeed 
that  the  trademark  rights  could  be  exhausted  because  the  products  were  brought  on  the 
market  by  the  proprietor  of  the  trademark  unless  there  were  legitimate  reasons  for  the 
trademark  proprietor  to  oppose  the  further  commercialization,  so  Article  15,  Paragraph  2 
of  the  Trademark  Directive. 
The  test  the  Court  applied  here  was  whether  or  not  there  was  damage  to  the 
reputation  of  Nomination’s  trademarks,  and  the  Court  said  yes;  the  elegant  packaging  of 
Nomination’s  bracelets  would  convey  an  image  of  luxury  to  purchasers,  and  this 
increases  the  reputation  of  the  trademarks,  and  selling  Nomination’s  products  in  a  small 
plastic  bag  is  likely  to  damage  that  reputation.  For  this  reason,  trademark  exhaustion  was 
denied.  This  might  be  quite  familiar,  the  repackaging  case,  which  might  not  be  that 
specific  to  luxury  goods. 
I  also  brought  a  German  case  which  goes  one  step  further.  It’s  a  case  which  was 
decided  by  the  Higher  Regional  Court  of  Düsseldorf  last  year,   Kanebo  v.  Real .  
11
 Kanebo  manufactures  and  sells  Japanese  luxury  cosmetics.  Real  is  a  German  
supermarket  chain  that  sold  gray-market  goods  of  Kanebo’s  luxury  cosmetics  through  its 
online  shop.  It  is  totally  undisputed  between  the  parties  that  these  were  goods  which  were 
put  onto  the  market  by  the  trademark  proprietor,  and  the  products  had  not  been  changed, 
altered,  or  repackaged.  Real  simply  sold  original  products.  This  was  undisputed. 
Nevertheless,  the  court  denied  exhaustion.  Why  is  that? 
 The  court  also  referred  to  Article  15,  Paragraph  2  of  the  Trademark  Directive  and  asked  
the  question  whether  or  not  there  are  legitimate  reasons  to  oppose  the  commercialization 
of  these  goods. 
 The  court  referred  to  an  earlier  judgment  of  the  CJEU  in  the Coty  Germany  case,   
12
which  was  a  case  about  antitrust  and  about  the  contractual  restrictions  in  selective 
distribution  systems. 
But  in  this  context  the  court  held  that  “the  quality  of  luxury  goods  is  not  just  the 
result  of  their  material  characteristics  but  also  to  the  allure  and  prestigious  image  which 
bestows  on  them  an  aura  of  luxury,  and  impairment  to  that  aura  of  luxury  is  likely  to 
affect  the  actual  quality  of  those  goods.” 
The  Düsseldorf  court  took  this  reasoning  and  said:  “The  permanent  and  extensive 
distribution  of  cosmetic  product  via  the  defendant’s  online  platform  is  capable  of 
significantly  impairing  the  image  of  the  trademarks,  and  the  way  in  which  the  goods  were 
presented  would  draw  the  trademark  into  the  everyday  and  ordinary,”  and  for  this  reason 
trademark  exhaustion  was  denied.” 
11  Oberlandesgericht  Düsseldorf  [OLG  Düsseldorf]  [Higher  Regional  Court  Düsseldorf] 
March  6,  2018,  I-20  U  113/17, 
https://www.justiz.nrw.de/nrwe/olgs/duesseldorf/j2018/I_20_U_113_17_Urteil_20180306.html. 
12  Case  C-230/16,  Coty  Germany  GmbH  v.  Parfümerie  Akzente  GmbH  (Dec.  6,  2017), 
http://curia.europa.eu. 
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We  can  talk  about  the  outlook  in  the  discussion. 
MS.  BERGER:  Thank  you. 
So,  Tobias,  is  it  fair  to  say  that  as  a  luxury  goods  company  in  Europe,  maybe 
even  specifically  in  Germany,  you  are  doing  quite  well  under  trademark  law? 
MR.  TIMMANN:  Yes,  of  course,  as  a  luxury  goods  producer.  It  is  a  single 
judgment,  and  maybe  this  is  the  starting  point  for  very  good  times  for  the  owners  of 
luxury  trademarks  in  Germany  or  in  the  Düsseldorf  court. 
MS.  BERGER:  Specifically. 
MR.  TIMMANN:  But  I  am  not  so  sure  if  this  decision  will  really  stand  because  if 
you  take  the  general  considerations,  which  are  the  reasons  for  trademark  exhaustion,  into 
account  —  the  free  movement  of  goods  within  the  internal  market,  and  that  the  essential 
function  of  the  trademark  that  should  be  protected  is  the  guarantee  to  identify  the  origin 
of  the  trademarked  product  —  those  considerations  in  cases  like  the Kanebo  case  would 
speak  in  favor  of  an  exhaustion  of  the  trademark  rights.  So  I’m  not  sure  if  at  the  end  this 
will  be  case  law  which  will  be  overcome  in  the  next  few  years. 
MS.  BERGER:  Okay.  Thank  you. 
We  have  Daan  on  the  panel,  who  represents  Omaha  for  us  —  what  Hugh  would 
call  “the  hinterlands”  —  because  we  really  needed  someone  who  is  not  engrossed  in 
luxury  and  iconic  brand  items  at  all  times. 
So  Daan,  please. 
MR.  ERIKSON:  Thanks,  Lena.  Yes,  I’m  here  representing  Middle  America.  I’m 
with  the  firm  Husch  Blackwell,  shortly  relocating  to  our  Chicago  office,  but  for  the  past 
four-and-a-half  years  I’ve  been  located  in  our  Omaha  office,  and  before  that  worked  for 
Hugh. 
With  that  context  in  mind,  I  thought  it  would  be  interesting  when  we  are  thinking 
about  the  question  that  was  presented  for  this  panel  —  is  there  a  separate  set  of  laws  that 
protects  luxury  or  iconic  brands  aside  from  your  more  mainstream  brands  —as  a  U.S. 
practitioner  I  think  the  answer  is  definitely  no.  However,  the  answer  in  the  United  States 
appears  to  be  very  different  from  Europe. 
The  only  place  where  you  might  see  luxury  or  iconic  brand  owners  have  more 
success  in  enforcement  is  if  they  meet  the  standard  for  fame  under  U.S.  federal  law  or  if 
they  are  just  putting  more  money  behind  the  enforcement  because  they  know  that  they 
need  to  make  sure  that  the  brands  retain  that  level  of  recognition  among  their  wealthier 
target  consumers. 
The  point  I  want  to  make  is  that  I  think  people  are  more  willing  to  protect  brands 
that  they  are  familiar  with.  This  also  relates  to  Anderson’s  comment  that  familiarity  may 
be  different  depending  where  you  are.  I  have  had  the  interesting  experience  of  working  in 
the  Midwest  and  becoming  familiar  with  many  brands  that  when  I  was  a  New  Yorker  I 
was  not  familiar  with. 
For  amusement,  I  sent  a  short  list  to  my  fellow  panelists  to  see  how  many  of 
them  they  would  recognize.  Just  as  one  example,  Valmont  is  a  company  that  is  very 
well-known  as  a  manufacturer  of  irrigation  systems  used  in  agriculture.  This  is  a  global 
company.  But  Emily  said  that  she  knew  V ALMONT  as  a  very  different  brand  that  I  was  not 
familiar  with. 
MS.  BORICH:  The  luxury  skin  care  line. 
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MR.  ERIKSON:  I  don’t  think  I’m  their  target  consumer,  so  that’s  fine. 
MS.  BERGER:  I  think  that  brings  us  back  to  a  short  comment  that  Anderson 
made.  It’s  about  your  community.  As  a  trademark  owner,  it  comes  down  to  your 
community  of  consumers  or  fans.  Do  you  want  to  talk  about  that? 
MR.  DUFF:  Sure.  I  had  a  very  interesting  moment.  It  was  a  teachable  moment 
for  me  in  Chicago,  actually.  I  thought  my  client  produced  adult  diapers.  I  flew  to  Chicago 
for  a  preliminary  injunction  hearing.  A  day  or  two  before  walking  into  the  courtroom,  the 
CEO  called  me  up  and  said,  “As  my  attorney  I  should  probably  let  you  know  that  we 
don’t  just  make  adult  diapers.  We  make  adult  diapers  for  the  adult  baby  diaper  lover 
fetish  community.”  
When  my  client  put  its  money  where  its  mouth  was  and  we  were  going  to  walk 
into  court,  the  white-shoe  attorney  who  had  been  representing  the  other  side  dropped  out, 
so  they  were  scrambling  to  find  another  attorney.  A  very  distinguished  member  of  the  bar 
who  is  the  assistant  director  of  the  IP  department  at  John  Marshall  Law  School  in 
Chicago  with  Daryl  Lim,  was  opposing  counsel.  One  of  the  greatest  moments  of  my  life 
was  when  the  judge  asked  him  to  define  the  relevant  consumer  for  those  products. 
The  teachable  moment  for  me  was  that  when  I  walked  into  that  courtroom  —  and 
I  had  never  before  had  an  audience  —  it  was  an  entirely  packed  courtroom.  They  were  all 
people  from  the  community,  because  it’s  a  very  tight-knit  community  as  I’ve  learned,  and 
they  care  a  lot  about  their  brand.  
All  the  companies  that  succeed  in  that  industry  do  a  lot  of  consumer  outreach  and 
consumer  education,  they  are  very  transparent,  and  they  tell  the  community  why  they  are 
bringing  a  certain  trademark  lawsuit.  Because  they  are  so  tight-knit  and  vocal,  I  have 
apparently  become  the  go-to  attorney  for  the  adult  baby  diaper  lover  fetish  community. 
You  don’t  have  to  take  my  word  for  that.  It’s  all  over  Reddit. 
MS.  BERGER:  But  that  might  be  the  point,  right?  When  the  first Louboutin  case 
was  filed,  I  remember  at  the  Fordham  IP  Institute  that  some  members  of  the  team  had  to 
educate  other  members  on  the  team  about  what  L OUBOUTIN  actually  was.  There  was 
already  a  tight-knit  community,  people  were  aware  of  the  brand,  but  it  was  a  niche  brand 
for  fashion  enthusiasts.  Louboutin’s  real  trademark  fame  came  because  of  the  lawsuits, 
right? 
This  is  time  for  our  general  discussion.  We  have  eleven  minutes  left.  There  you 
go. 
QUESTION  [Aloys  Hüttermann,  Michalski  Hüttermann,  Düsseldorf]:  I  must  say 
I  have  a  little  difficulty  with  these  exhaustion  cases,  which  started  with  the Coty  case.  It  is 
not  really  that  there  is  a  different  set  of  laws  for  luxury  goods  and  other  goods.  I  would 
say  it  is  a  different  set  of  laws  for  existing  luxury  goods  and  new  luxury  goods. 
You  can  only  relate  to  exhaustion  and  say  there  was  no  exhaustion  if  you  are 
already  famous.  If  you  are  not  —  and  this  is  what  Peter  says,  which  is  I  think  an 
important  point  —  that  if  you  have  a  famous  mark  now  and  there  is  a  case  about  this, 
then  this  should  help  future  marks  that  also  want  to  get  famous. 
If  you  are  now  building  up  a  luxury  brand  which  you  think  is  a  luxury  brand  but 
Real  just  buys  it  and  sells  it,  you  cannot  prevent  it  because  you  are  not  famous.  If  you 
cannot  prevent  it,  then  you  will  never  be  a  luxury  good  because  then  people  will  say, 
“Well,  look,  your  stuff  is  being  sold  at  Real.”  It’s  like  a  Catch-22  situation. 
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I  must  say  I’m  not  too  happy  with  that.  Maybe  you  could  comment  on  that. 
MR.  TIMMANN:  I  think  you  already  noticed  from  my  comment  that  I  also  am 
not  that  happy  with  this  decision.  It  all  comes  down  to  the  question  of  what  is  a  luxury 
good?  Before  I  read  this  judgment  I  didn’t  know  the  K ANEBO  brand.  Maybe  it  is  because  I 
do  not  use  cosmetics.  But  even  now,  when  I  talk  to  friends  —  K ANEBO ,  okay,  maybe  it  is  a 
luxury  brand  or  a  luxury  good,  but  I  don’t  think  it’s  that  famous  in  Germany. 
If  you  have  two  different  sets  of  laws,  then  really  you  have  demarcation  problems 
to  say  in  which  direction  the  case  should  run.  “Is  it  a  luxury  good  or  not”  I  think  is  not 
good  for  trademark  law. 
What  I  recognize  with  my  clients  is  that  now  everyone  is  a  luxury  brand  and  tells 
me  that  all  the  case  law  is  applicable  to  them  because  they  are  of  course  luxury.  Then,  at 
the  end,  maybe  it  is  very  much  about  convincing  a  single  judge  or  a  panel  of  judges  that 
you  are  a  luxury  brand,  and  this  really,  as  we  already  said  here,  very  much  depends  on  the 
private  life  of  the  single  judge  maybe. 
PROF.  DR.  RUESS:  Just  a  short  comment.  First,  I  do  think  it  is  still  possible  to 
develop  a  luxury  brand.  As  Aloys  rightfully  mentioned,  the  L OUBOUTIN  mark,  for 
example,  is  relatively  recent.  It  came  into  a  market  filled  with  luxury  shoes  from  many 
other  labels.  But  it  was  nothing  totally  new. 
Second,  I  understand  that  it  is  not  something  you  like,  but  when  we  talk  about 
two  separate  sets  of  law  it  would  probably  help  to  see  that  when  you  talk  about  law 
coming  out  of  the  European  Union  you  have  to  very  closely  watch  whether  the  case  was 
decided  by  a  national  court  or  the  CJEU.  A  German  national  court  will  regard  a 
trademark  largely  as  a  source  indicator,  which  is  why  I  was  surprised  about  this  very 
interesting  decision  that  Tobias  referenced.  Whereas  the  CJEU  has  always  —  as  we’ve 
seen  in  the Mitsubishi  decision  and  many  others  —  been  extremely  careful  about  
13
protecting  the  investment.  That  is  a  fundamentally  different  approach.  So  in  the  CJEU  the 
motivation  behind  the  decision  may  be  different  from  what  it  is  in  a  national  decision. 
Given  the  system  of  the  courts,  of  course  it  is  inevitable  that  the  national  court 
does  not  want  to  be  bashed  all  the  time  by  the  CJEU,  so  they  might  move  in  the  direction 
of  protecting  the  investment  function,  which  is  very  dear  to  the  CJEU,  and  that  is 
something  which  inevitably  is  more  likely  to  be  found  within  the  luxury  market  than 
within  the  common  goods  market. 
MS.  BERGER:  Thank  you,  Peter.  There  were  more  questions  over  there. 
QUESTION  [Manuel  Wegrostek,  Gassauer-Fleissner,  Austria]:  Just  a  quick 
question  for  Tobias.  From  my  understanding  of  the  case  in  the  Düsseldorf  court,  did  the 
court  just  say  that  any  sale  over  the  Internet  of  a  luxury  good  at  all  would  be  damaging  to 
the  reputation  or  did  it  consider  the  facts  of  the  case?  Is  Real  a  discount  supermarket?  I 
don’t  know  that  supermarket  chain. 
MR.  TIMMANN:  Real  is  not  a  discount  supermarket  chain,  but  it  has  discount 
products  in  its  offering. 
MS.  BERGER:  It’s  at  the  lower  end  of  the  spectrum,  and  it’s  known  for  selling 
gray-market  goods. 
13  Case  C-129/17,  Mitsubishi  Shoji  Kaisha  Ltd  v.  Duma  Forklifts  (July  25,  2018), 
http://curia.europa.eu.  
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QUESTIONER  [Mr.  Wegrostek]:  Does  that  mean  in  effect  that  any  sale  over  the 
Internet  would  be  damaging? 
MR.  TIMMANN:  No,  the  court  did  not  say  that  any  sale  through  the  Internet 
would  lead  to  impairment  of  the  reputation.  But  the  court  indeed  looked  at  the 
environment  where  the  products  were  offered  —  the  K ANEBO  products  were  offered 
beside  the  discount  products  of  Real  —  and  then  said  in  this  environment  they  are  drawn 
to  the  ordinary. 
QUESTIONER  [Mr.  Wegrostek]:  But  there  are  some  brands  that  actually  restrict 
their  sales  to  just  brick-and-mortar  retailers,  and  that’s  permissible.  I  don’t  know  if  I’m 
correct  about  this  from  my  knowledge  of  fashion,  but  as  far  as  I  know,  L OUBOUTIN  or 
similar  luxury  brands  would  only  be  sold  through  brick-and-mortar  stores,  and  that  is  still 
permitted  under  antitrust  law  as  far  as  I  understand. 
MR.  TIMMANN:  Yes,  it  is. 
MS.  BERGER:  Thank  you. 
QUESTION  [Gordon  Humphreys,  EUIPO  Boards  of  Appeal,  Alicante]:  We  have 
interpreted  “iconic”  as  meaning  luxury,  but  iconic  is  not  always  luxury.  Take  M ONSTER  or 
R ED  B ULL ;  they  are  household  names.  To  me  iconic  is  something  that’s  a  household  name. 
I  think  the  question  is  aren’t  we  giving  more  protection  to  iconic  brands  than 
other  brands?  I  think  the  answer  is  clearly  yes,  especially  in  the  domain  of  famous  marks 
or  marks  with  a  reputation,  such  as  the  ones  I’ve  just  mentioned. 
The  problem  with  that  —  and  Peter  is  quite  right  that  in  Europe  at  least  it  is  an 
investment  consideration  —  is  are  we  in  danger  of  encouraging  trademark  bullies  here, 
which  is  something  we  didn’t  get  an  opportunity  to  discuss?  I  looked  at  a  list  of  so-called 
“trademark  bullies”  on  this  side  of  the  Atlantic,  and  it  was  very  interesting  that  the 
Monster  company  was  number  one.  I  think  that  few  would  disagree  that  wasn’t  also  the 
case  on  the  other  side  of  that  Atlantic. 
So  my  question  is,  do  you  think  that  by  giving  this  added  protection  to  iconic 
brands  that  we  do  in  fact  encourage  bullies? 
MR.  DUFF:  I  would  like  to  speak  to  that.  I  am  good  friends  with  the  former 
director  of  the  Suffolk  IP  Clinic,  who  litigated  against  Monster  incessantly,  so  I  have  a 
personal  animosity  toward  that  particular  trademark  bully. 
But  I  think  whether  or  not  a  company  is  a  trademark  bully  depends  on  the  quality 
of  its  attorney  and  the  people  running  the  company.  At  least  in  the  United  States,  I  don’t 
think  it  is  the  idea  of  dilution  that  creates  the  trademark  bully.  I  think  it’s  the  idea  that  if 
you  don’t  police  your  trademark,  then  you  run  the  risk  of  losing  your  rights,  and  that  is  to 
protect  the  consumers  from  confusion. 
To  get  back  to  my  earlier  comment,  I  think  that  good  attorneys  will  advise  their 
clients  that  there  are  ways  to  police  your  trademark  without  being  a  bully.  You  can  be  like 
my  parents  were,  stern  but  loving.  I  think  it  is  all  in  the  approach  that  you  take. 
Monster  is  apparently  run  by  monsters.  I  don’t  know  who  their  attorneys  are.  The 
ones  that  I  do  know  I’m  not  going  to  mention.  I  would  like  to  think  that  their  attorneys 
tried  to  talk  them  out  of  that.  Otherwise,  maybe  cynically,  they  just  wanted  to  get  some 
billable  hours  there. 
But  I  don’t  think  it’s  the  idea  of  dilution  or  giving  added  protection  to  iconic 
brands  that  creates  bullies.  I  think  bullies  are  probably  created  in  middle  school. 
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MS.  BERGER:  One  more  question. 
QUESTION  [William  McNichol,  Rutgers  Law  School]:  The  idea  that  luxury 
goods  can  be  resold  in  a  manner  that  detracts  from  the  cachet  that’s  attached  to  them 
ignores  the  fact  that  the  original  purchaser  may  in  fact  be  somebody  who  uses  the  product 
in  a  way  that  detracts  from  the  cachet.  Not  every  woman  who  buys  a  L OUBOUTIN  shoe  is 
six  foot  tall,  weighs  ninety-five  pounds,  and  looks  like  Carrie  Bradshaw.  Middle-aged, 
balding  men  going  through  midlife  crisis  buy  high-end  sports  cars. 
If  you  are  not  going  to  restrict  your  purchasing  public  to  people  who  reflect  your 
luxury  cachet,  it  seems  a  little  bit  late  in  the  game  to  then  keep  that  purchaser  —  who  you 
gladly  took  money  from  —  from  reselling  it  to  somebody  else  in  some  other  fashion,  in 
some  other  packaging. 
MR.  DUFF:  I  think  that’s  a  great  point. 
MS.  BORICH:  I’ll  jump  in.  I  think  that  brand  owners  have  the  right  to  control  the 
quality  of  their  goods,  their  own  community.  This  goes  back  to  what  Daan  said  earlier: 
brands  do  have  a  sense  of  community  and  work  hard  to  attract  and  market  to  the  type  of 
consumers  who  fit  in  that  community.  I  think  it  does  seem  a  little  far-reaching  to  say  that 
brands  can  restrict  some  consumers  from  purchasing  their  goods. 
But  you  know  what?  Some  of  them  do,  like  Hermès,  for  example.  You  can’t  just 
walk  into  a  store  and  buy  a  Birkin  bag:  you  need  to  be  on  a  list;  you  need  to  be  approved. 
So,  on  some  level  I  guess  brands  do  do  that. 
MS.  BERGER:  Peter,  one  very  final  thought. 
PROF.  DR.  RUESS:  Just  one  thought.  There  was  a  Federal  Supreme  Court  case  
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in  Germany  where  Rolex  had  a  watch  that  somebody  purchased  and  added X  thousand 
diamonds  on  it.  Rolex  just  cached  it  and  said,  “It  doesn’t  look  nice.  We  don’t  give  it  back 
to  you.”  They  lost  that  case  in  all  instances,  until  the  Federal  Supreme  Court  said, 
“Trademarks  are  made  for  men;  men  are  not  made  for  trademarks.”  That  probably 
bolsters  your  point. 
MS.  BERGER:  On  that  note,  thank  you,  panel. 
14  Bundesgerichtshof  [BGH]  [Federal  Court  of  Justice]  Feb.  12,  1998,  Neue  Juristische 
Wochenzeitschrift  [NJW]  1998,  2045. 
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